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Avoiding Extreme Risk Before it Occurs: 
A Complexity Science Approach Toward Incubation  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Crises appearing in many kinds of organizations are found to be mostly caused by management 
and workers. The acquisition of the Southern Pacific railroad by the Union Pacific in 1996 
provides a dramatic case of how tiny initiating events – incubation events – that appeared 
chaotic, random, and unimportant to an arrogant management, spiralled into a crisis. The article 
draws on theories from complexity science to explain how and why such spiralling processes are 
set off. The various kinds of initiating incubation events are connected to five specific scale-free 
theories. Knowledge of each scale-free theory, and others, offers managers improved chances of 
dealing with incubation events sooner. Given that people often ‗don’t see what they aren’t 
looking for‘, scale-free theories as a means of lessening cognitive blindness and giving the 
concept of mindfulness more visual substance. As managers train to be more sensitive to scale-
free causes, their chances of avoiding extreme crises are improved. 
Key words: incubation crises, complexity science, scalability, UP/SP merger, mindfulness. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
People often take too long to recognize that their expectations are being violated and that 
a problem is growing more severe.... Managing the unexpected often occurs in the 
earliest stages, when the unexpected may give off only weak signals. (Weick & Sutcliff 
2001, pp. 2–4) 
The problem is that ‗weak signals‘ very often don‘t attract the attention of decision makers as 
being the potential precursors of possible extreme outcomes, whether they are deemed to be 
good or bad. Mostly they simply aren‘t seen, or if seen, aren‘t paid attention to. Opposite the 
dominant fear of bias from theory ladenness (Kuhn, 1962; Churchland, 1979; Franklin et al., 
1989; Guba & Lincoln, 1994), we pick up on the idea that it is quite often the case that ‗you 
don’t see what you aren’t looking for‘, which stems from cognitive blindness (Simons & 
Chabris, 1999, Simons & Rensink, 2005; Simons et al., 2005).  
What Weick and Sutcliffe call ‗weak signals‘ in their book, Managing the Unexpected (2001) 
Holland (2002) refers to as tiny initiating events (TIEs).
1
 TIEs often first appear as random, 
seemingly meaningless events that are easy to overlook or even ignore; and yet they can spiral up 
into extreme events of disaster proportions. A key crisis management question, then, is: How to 
accentuate the discovery of TIES and learn how diminish their effect – manage them away – so 
that they do not promulgate major crises? 
Weick and Sutcliff (2001) examine the manner in which ‗high-reliability organizations‘ such 
as air traffic control systems, aircraft carriers, nuclear power plants and hospital emergency 
facilities have learned to pay more attention to Holland‘s  (TIEs) in the control of risk.2 Needless 
to say, TIEs are invariably seen in retrospective analyses of why disasters occur. For example, 
                                                 
1
 His actual phrasing is ‗small ―inexpensive‖ inputs cause major directed effects in cas dynamics‘ (2002, p. 29). 
2
 Note that we could just as easily substitute Turner‘s (1976) ‗incubation’ for Holland‘s ‗initiating’ events in the 
acronym, TIEs; either term is appropriate for us.  
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before 9/11, the FBI was more or less aware of 52 seemingly random and not easily explained 
events that were ignored, even though the whistleblower, Coleen Rowley, wrote a paper for FBI 
Director, Robert Mueller, criticizing the agency for ignoring crucial evidence about jihadi 
training activities and describing failures at one Field Office that had acquired information about 
a specific Al Qa'ida terrorist, Zacarias Moussaoui, and actually had taken him into custody on 
August 15, 2001 (Rowley, 2002). Most of the TIEs that spiralled up to cause the total failure of 
the Union Pacific railroad (UP) after its merger with the Southern Pacific railroad (SP) had 
already been observed causing slowdowns on the SP before the merger – but the UP ignored 
them until too late. All of the early causes that finally spiralled up into the bank-liquidity induced 
worldwide recession were all identifiable early on by some people (Cooper, 2008; Morris, 2008), 
and even bet against by John Paulson and George Soros – who sold short and thereby made 
~$6.9billions on the crashing stock markets just between the two of them! (Anderson, 2008).  
Our focus in this article is to help managers avoid cognitive blindness in order to see TIES 
more clearly and much earlier so they can shut them down before an extreme event occurs. The 
crisis management literature defines crises as incubating (Turner, 1976) or smouldering (Smith 
& Millar, 2002) inside firms, that they begin with small internal events (Lester & King, 2006), 
and that 80% of these are human related (Mitroff, et al., 1996). We wish to separate out and put 
our attention on incubation-TIEs that managers might actually recognize and manage before they 
become disasters (e.g., see Mitroff, 2000; Barton, 2001; Oren, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
We emphasize authors who focus on the early TIE-recognition process and who discuss various 
examples of TIEs – events that do actually scale up into extreme outcomes. Given this, we take 
the view that if managers became more familiar with ‗scale-free theories‘ they would better and 
sooner be able to see possible scale-free causal developments spiralling into extreme outcomes. 
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What are scale-free theories? These point to TIEs and subsequent developments in firms that 
could scale up into extreme events. They help managers recognize TIEs earlier rather than when 
it is too late. We draw from complexity science to explain what scale-free theories are. Andriani 
and McKelvey (2009) describe fifteen theories showing different ways TIEs can scale up into 
disasters; we discuss five of these in detail, using specific examples from a now classic business 
case – the disaster occurring after the merger of the Union Pacific (UP) and Southern Pacific 
(SP) railroads in the U.S. – to illustrate how each scale-free theory helps managers see emergent 
TIEs, and then ‗manage‘ them into irrelevance before they spiral into crises. 
We begin with a short review of the basic elements of complexity science that are most 
relevant to understanding what kinds of incubation TIEs are apt to scale up into extremes. We 
don‘t describe the various scale-free theories until later in the merger-case description when we 
can connect each theory to TIEs in the merger situation. Next, we give a short history of the 
UP/SP merger, showing how TIEs apply to the situation and ending with reference to Langer‘s 
(1989) concept of mindfulness, which was brought into the management literature by Weick et 
al. (1999). Then we detail the several scale-free theories that we argue help managers look for 
and see the relevant incubation TIEs; we first describe each scale-free theory and then show its 
relevance in explaining various TIE spirals in the merger case.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The veteran crisis management researcher, Ian Mitroff, defines a major crisis as follows: 
A crisis is an event that affects or has the potential to affect the whole of an 
organization…. It must exact a major toll on human lives, property, financial earnings, 
the reputation, and the general health and well-being of an organization…. More often 
than not…a major crisis is something that ‗cannot be completely contained within the 
walls of an organization‘. (Mitroff, 2000, pp. 34–35)  
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Coombs (1999) says that ‗a crisis is a major, unpredictable event that threatens to harm an 
organization and its stakeholders. Although crisis events are unpredictable, they are not 
unexpected‘. Mitroff also notes that ‗major crises occur not only because of what an organization 
knows, anticipates, and plans for, but just as much because of what it does not know and does 
not anticipate‘ (2000, p. 35). Different hazards pose different but always unexpected risks 
(Wisner, et al., 2004). Emergency management aims to avoid risks (Haddow & Bullock, 2004). 
Risk mitigation aims to prevent hazards from developing into disasters or reduce their 
consequences. Smith (2008) defines a crisis as ‗an event, or series of events, that exceeds, or 
comes close to exceeding, an organisation‘s abilities to cope with the task demands of the event. 
Many crises, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, explosions, falling cranes and bridges, floods, 
and forest fires are not predictable as to specific timing or impact. While in general we know that 
there are more fires in dry seasons, avalanche disasters are more likely in the Alps, hurricanes are 
more apt to hit Florida, and earthquakes more likely in California and Turkey, we can‘t yet 
predict specific time and place. These are referred to as ‗sudden onset‘ crises.  
In his now classic paper, Turner (1976) focuses on the ‗incubation phase‘ of a smouldering 
crisis, that is, the early stage when ‗…a chain of discrepant events develop and accumulate 
unnoticed‘ (p. 381; our italics). He finds several similarities across three disasters in mining, rail 
crossing, and a holiday leisure building: rigidities in perception, attention to known problems 
decoys people away from new incubations, disregard of information from outsiders, and 
information obscurities. Reason (1990) calls incubation events ‗pathogens‘ – ‗minor causes, 
misperceptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications‘ – smouldering in obscurity until a 
‗trigger event‘ leads to escalation (Smith, 2002). Perrow (1984, p. 106) observes that disasters 
are more likely to occur when the pathogens (TIEs) are ‗tightly coupled‘, with complex 
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interactions leading to a ‗significant degree of incomprehensibility‘. Radell (1992) refers to what 
the Russians called ‗storming‘ – which occurs when management speeds up production (trying to 
set a production record  at the Wilberg coal mine) or sets up an aggressive schedule (Chernobyl 
& Three Mile Island).  
Turner (1994) blames ‗sloppy management‘ for most of what happens in the incubation 
period, as does Smith (2006a). ICM (2008) reports that 80% of crises are internal to firms, 
caused by management and workers. Using Reason‘s ‗Swiss cheese‘ model, Smith (2006b) puts 
all of the pathogens in Turner‘s incubation phase into his own Swiss cheese management 
practice model, referring to them as ‗pathways of vulnerability‘. He notes that the critical 
elements most likely to foster a progression toward a crisis tipping point are nonlinear dynamics, 
little forceful evidence calling for change, and increasing interconnections within and among 
organizations around the world.  
Other crises are defined as ‗smouldering crises‘. ICM (2008) reports that since 1990, some 
65% of crises reported in the media are of the smouldering kind. Among many others, Lester and 
King (2006, p. 3) say, ‗smouldering crises begin as small, internal problems that, because of a 
lack of appropriate managerial attention, become large, public problems‘. Smouldering crises are 
typically ‗human-caused crises‘ stemming from ‗defects within the larger organization or 
system‘ (Mitroff, Pearson, & Harrington, 1996, p. 43). Human-caused crises tend to ‗leave a trail 
of early-warning signals‘ (Lester & King, p. 3; our italics). The analyses of what caused the 
Challenger and Columbia space-shuttle failures show a number of seemingly trivial early-
warnings by employees that were ignored until the disasters were triggered by random external 
events – the Challenger‘s launch in freezing weather and the large piece of launch debris that 
damaged the insulation material on the Columbia – which showed up on its final re-entry into 
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Earth‘s atmosphere (Rogers, 1986; CAIB, 2003).  
We believe it is important to clearly distinguish between incubation and smouldering – it is 
easy to see overlap in the definitions. We try to clarify as follows:  
 Incubation: As we quote Turner above, incubation is defined as ‗a chain of discrepant events [that] 
develop and accumulate unnoticed‘. Here it is the incubation-TIEs that eventually scale up to cause 
the disaster. They are, indeed, the causal events that, left unfettered, spiral up to extreme proportions. 
The 9/11 disaster is a good example of incubation ignored; the early clues were about terrorist TIEs 
that were ignored long enough that the terrorists could finally organize to produce the disaster. Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2001) focus on incubation events in the high-reliability organizations they study. Their 
detailing of the total collapse of the UP after its merger with the SP is a classic example of incubation 
TIEs that were well known before the merger but were ignored. We will detail this progression later.  
 Smouldering: These are ‗accidents waiting to happen‘. Some ‗early warning‘ clues may exist but they 
are ignored. But the clues, per se, don‘t spiral up to cause a disaster. As was the case with the 
Challenger disaster, there were clues offered that freezing weather might cause a problem with the 
seals, but nothing was done and nothing happened until the first early-morning launch in below-
freezing temperatures, which caused the seals to shrink and become brittle. In this case TIEs are in the 
form of clues that could spiral up to gain management‘s attention, but bureaucracy suppresses them – 
they do not spiral up to cause disasters. The problem here is not that early warning clues spiral up to 
cause an extreme outcome; the disaster happens because the early clues don’t spiral up to get 
management‘s attention. Perrow‘s ‗normal accidents‘ fit here; the clues were not seen or were ignored; 
the connectivity that occurred at some point was the ‗random‘ triggering event. 
While crisis management is only concerned with TIEs scaling up to negative outcomes, we 
recognize that managers would also like to discover early on and then enable TIEs that could 
scale up into positive extremes like Microsoft, Wal-Mart or Google. There is risk in bad things 
happening and in good things not happening. Here, however, we focus only on the former. The 
management problem is: How to transform TIEs into TIE ‘levers’ (Holland, 2002) – that is, 
actions that may be used to stop bad TIEs from spiralling into negative extreme events.
3
  
                                                 
3
 Elsewhere we focus on how to use TIEs and scale-free theory for better managing toward positive extremes 
(Andriani & McKelvey, 2009) 
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We focus on incubation-TIEs that are embedded in the human causes of incubation events – 
people, workers vs. managers, corporate and disciplinary silos and hierarchies (Turner, 1976, 
1994; Mitroff et al. (1996), self-protection (Mars & Frosdick, 1997; Vaughan, 1997), human 
tendencies toward bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), groupthink (Janis, 1972), or more 
generally, cognitive, organizational, and political motivations (Bazerman & Watkins, 2004) and 
networks (Newman, 2003; Newman et al., 2006).  
III. CAUSES OF SCALABILITY: A COMPLEXITY SCIENCE VIEW 
As noted at the outset, academics (Franklin et al., 1989; Guba and Lincoln, 1994) and 
philosophers of science (Kuhn, 1962), mostly worry about researchers so blinded by their 
theories/beliefs that they often see and report what is not really there – classic cases being the 
French discovery of ‗N waves‘ (Klotz, 1980; Nye, 1980), ‗water memory‘ (Maddox et al., 1988), 
and Fleischmann and Pons‘s (1989) reporting of their cold-fusion results. To help managers 
better see what they really aren‘t wanting to pay attention to – i.e., TIEs – we begin our analysis 
by defining ‗scale-free theories‘ that serve as ways of sharpening managers‘ abilities to see TIES 
early on. These are theories about how TIEs scale up into extreme positive or negative outcomes.  
We begin with scalability, then discuss power-law indicators, and then briefly review some 
underlying complexity science discoveries. Learning more about these underlying causal 
processes paves the way toward seeing TIEs sooner and before they scale up into extreme 
negative outcomes. Scalability is usually indicated by power laws and results from self-
organization. 
Scalability. Consider a cauliflower. Cut off a ‗floret;‘ then cut a smaller floret from the first; 
then keep cutting off successively smaller florets in this way. Each subcomponent is smaller than 
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the former, but each exhibits the same shape, structure, and genesis. The cauliflower evolved to 
this state because it is governed by Galileo‘s ‗square-cube law‘ of surface-to-volume ratio, the 
biological basis of its survival and adaptation, i.e., the surface entities have to keep subdividing 
to keep surface area at the same ratio as volume increases. Following Haire (1959), Stephan 
(1983) applies the square-cube law to firm effectiveness. Employees bringing resources (sales, 
new ideas & technology) in from outside the firm are ‗surface‘ employees. ‗Volume‘ employees 
are those inside who produce and coordinate. As firms grow, maintaining the square-cube ratio 
requires adding more surface units or making volume units more efficient. A firm adopting 
Simon‘s (1962) architecture of complexity theory – which is also scale-free – would apply his 
‗near decomposability‘ rule at all levels – from bottom to top. Jack Welsh achieved this with his 
‗Be No. 1 or No. 2 in your industry or else…‘ rule (Tichy & Sherman, 1994, p. 108; somewhat 
paraphrased), by injecting adaptive tension (McKelvey, 2008) at all levels. These are 
organizational examples of Mandelbrot‘s scale-free Fractal Geometry (1982).4 
Fractals often appear as the result of mathematical equations.
5
 The cauliflower is different; it 
is an example of a fractal in nature that results from adaptive Darwinian natural-selection 
processes (Iannaccone & Khokha, 1996; West et al., 1997). We focus on the latter. Inside bodies, 
as a result of evolutionary processes, we see fractal structures in DNA base chemicals, genetic 
circuitry, protein-protean interactions, cell metabolism, and bronchial structure, and so on (see 
Andriani & McKelvey, 2007, for examples and citations). Many fractal structures in biology are 
due to predator/prey dynamics; McKelvey et al. (2009) cite nineteen examples. 
Why do fractal structures occur? The mathematical equation is the same at multiple levels of a 
                                                 
4
 Fractals are defined as shapes that can be subdivided into parts, each of which is (at least approximately) a 
reduced-size copy of the whole (Mandelbrot, 1982). The same mathematical equation – or adaptive causal dynamic 
in biology or in organizations – creates similar causal dynamics at each level of a fractal structure. 
5
 Rather than take up space to illustrate math-based and nature-based fractals, we suggest clicking on the 
following URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fractal   It is informative and picturesque. 
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math-created fractal; the adaptive response of a biological agent depends on the same causes 
operating at multiple levels of a bio-fractal. Even though the cause is the same at multiple levels, 
however, the consequence can be nonlinear; that is, nonlinear outcomes resulting when a single 
event out of myriad very small events gets amplified – e.g., by positive feedback – to generate an 
extreme effect extending across multiple levels. These nonlinear dynamics are explained by 
scale-free theories.  
Scale-free theories explain why we see fractal structures and long-tailed, Pareto-distributed 
phenomena within firms and within organizational populations and ecosystems (West & 
Deering, 1995; Newman, 2005; Andriani & McKelvey, 2009). Fractal structures emerge 
because, as in the cauliflower, the same cause applies at multiple levels. While incubation-TIEs 
are required as initiating events, disasters only happen if they scale up in size or consequence – 
i.e., spread throughout a large and essential department or scale up or down to affect other 
hierarchical levels in a firm. These theories apply when the same causes operate at multiple 
levels to yield what Gell-Mann (1988, p. 3) labels ‗deep simplicity‘ – a single theory explaining 
dynamics at multiple levels. Scale-free theories point to a single generative cause to explain the 
dynamics at each of however many levels are being studied;  
Power Laws. A Pareto rank/frequency distribution – e.g., a distribution of cities and towns 
ranging from thousands of small villages in one long tail on the Y-axis to the single largest city 
(London in the UK; New York in the U.S.) at the end of the other tail on the X-axis – plotted in 
terms of double-log scales appears as a power law, which is an inverse sloping straight line (Zipf, 
1949; Andriani & McKelvey, 2007). Power laws often take the form of rank/size expressions 
such as F ~ N
 –β
, where F is frequency, N is rank (the variable) and β, the exponent, is constant. 
In most ‗exponential‘ functions, e.g., p(y) ~ e(ax), the exponent is the variable and e (Euler 
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number) is constant. Power laws are increasingly discovered in social and organizational 
phenomena. The size of firms follows a power law (Stanley et al., 1996; Axtell, 2001). Brock 
(2000) says power laws are the fundamental feature of the Santa Fe Institute‘s approach to 
complexity science. Gell-Mann (2002) follows this up by saying that complexity phenomena 
such as scalability and power laws are just as important for scientific study as are physicists‘ 
traditional axiomatic based, law-like phenomena, and more importantly for us, are even more 
important in the study of living systems. 
Specifically, the extreme outcome at one end of the Pareto rank/frequency distribution is 
typically an N = 1 extreme event – a No. 9 quake on the Richter Scale; a world-wide pandemic 
like the Black Plague; the Challenger disaster; or Microsoft and Wal-Mart. At the opposite end 
the N can run into the millions and more – think of all the Ma&Pa stores.6 The mean, mode, and 
median do not overlap, as they do in a normal distribution. Methods of good management at one 
extreme do not apply to the opposite extreme – managing a Ma&Pa store is not the same as 
managing Wal-Mart. As Axtell (2008) points out, ‗the typical firm does not exist‘. Managing the 
median firm is not the same as managing at either extreme. Our interest here, however, is how 
events in the ‗micro‘ tail sometimes scale up to the extreme in the opposite tail. 
We argue that the power law discoveries discussed above apply to management and 
organizations, especially since they are good indicators of fractal structures and scalability in 
action and, consequently, underlying Pareto distributions (Andriani & McKelvey, 2007, 2009; 
Boisot & McKelvey, 2007). There is good reason to believe that power-law effects are also 
ubiquitous in organizations and have far greater consequences than current management theories 
presume. As noted above, fractal phenomena in bodies (fish, birds, mammals) (as indicated by 
                                                 
6
 In the U.S. these are defined as sole proprietor (or husband & wife run) stores that do not have paid employees. 
There are 17 million of them in the U.S.  
11 
 
power laws) are essential to life and survival in predator/prey ecologies (McKelvey et al., 2009). 
In organizations we see power laws that indicate entrepreneurship (Poole et al., 2000), alliance 
networks (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003), bankruptcies (Fujiwara, 2004), biotech networks 
(Powell et al., 2005), industry growth (Ishikawa, 2006), economic change (Podobnik et al., 
2006), product development (Braha & Bar-Yam, 2007) and M&A waves (Park, 2008). 
Underlying all of these examples are tension, connectivity, and TIEs that do, in fact, scale up to 
form Pareto distributions and power laws. Elsewhere, we list 86 kinds of power law findings in 
socio-organizational phenomena (Andriani & McKelvey, 2009). 
The foregoing are all based on after-the-fact data analyses, and they are all power-law 
evidence of constructive kinds of scalability, fractals, and Pareto distributions. For these, 
Holland‘s (2002) TIE ‗levers‘ are critically important. TIE levers are tiny initiating/incubation 
events that, by using appropriate scalability levers, managers can ‗lever‘ behaviour in their firms 
up into dramatic positive Pareto distributions and positive extreme outcomes – like Microsoft, 
Wal-Mart, and Google. Oppositely, in firms like Parmalot, Enron, Northern Rock, or Lehman 
Brothers, the beginnings of ‗could-become‘ power law distributions that stem from negative 
TIEs are what managers really want to avoid. This means that managers have to get into the 
business of checking all sorts of organizational data and distributions to see if they are negative 
phenomena beginning to show signs of what could become power laws. If so, managers would 
want to hammer these power laws and the TIEs that started them back into oblivion. 
Tension. Self-organization in complex systems typically appears in the ‗region of emergence‘ 
between the ‗edge of order‘ and the ‗edge of chaos‘, often termed the 1st and 2nd critical values of 
imposed energy or tension (Stauffer, 1987; Kauffman, 1993). We discuss each next: 
Edge of order. Prigogine (1955) built on Bénard‘s (1901) study of emergent structures in 
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fluids. In a teapot, for example, the ‗rolling boil‘ familiar to chefs describes a phase transition 
from molecules dissipating heat by vibrating faster in place to molecules circulating around the 
pot, thereby speeding up heat transfer. Because these emergent structures serve to dissipate 
energy imposing on a system from outside, he labelled them ‗dissipative structures‘. This phase 
transition—which occurs at the so-called ‗1st critical value‘ of imposed energy (what McKelvey, 
2008) calls ‗adaptive tension‘)—defines ‗the edge of order’. This theory of phase transitions 
stems from physics (Prigogine, 1955; Haken, 1977; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989; Mainzer, 
1994/2007). As systems tip across the edge of order we see phase transitions in which new kinds 
of order (structure and process) emerge. Because of the bank-liquidity crisis first appearing in 
2007 and because of the following world-wide recession (2008–2010), we now see the economic 
tension imposed by the liquidity crisis creating a world-wide phase transition in how 
governments are responding to bail out banks, and in the future work toward a new world-wide 
bank-regulation process. The free-market thinking of ‗Reaganomics‘, which led to the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act (created in 1933 to prevent banks from risking depositors money) in 1999 
(Kauffman, 2008), is now being replaced by a more Keynesian-based approach with more 
government controls over bank risk-taking and use of high leverage (Soros, 2008; Pollin, 2009) 
Edge of chaos. Scientists at the Santa Fe Institute focus mostly on living systems and how 
heterogeneous agents interact and self-organize at the ‗edge of chaos‘ so as to create new kinds 
of order (Gell-Mann, 1988; Holland, 1988, 1995; Arthur, 1993; and Kauffman, 1993). Between 
the ‗edges‘ of order and chaos lies a region of emergent complexity, sometimes called the 
‗melting zone‘ of maximum adaptive capability (Stauffer, 1987; Kauffman, 1993). Bak (1996) 
argued that to survive, entities maintain themselves in a state of ‗self-organized criticality‘ 
13 
 
(defined in Table 1) near the ‗edge of chaos’ (Lewin, 1992; Kauffman, 1993).7 The signifiers of 
the melting zone are self-organization, emergence and nonlinearity. Self-organization occurs 
when heterogeneous agents in search of improved fitness interconnect under conditions of 
exogenously or endogenously imposed adaptive tension. New order is an emergent outcome of 
the self-organizing process. 
The fact that extreme events start from TIEs and then spiral up into macrophenomena
8
 that are 
orders of magnitude larger poses a problem: where do they acquire/find the energy to do so? In a 
linear world, such as the case with neoclassical economics and disciplines inspired by the 
equilibrium assumption, large-scale deviations from equilibrium (the normal state)
9
 can only be 
generated by large-scale causes that act with the same scale on the effect, i.e., the outcome is a 
linear function of the cause. Instead, in a nonlinear world, the potential of TIEs to cause 
transformation on a scale completely different from their own has to be explained by a different 
process. For TIEs to unleash radical change, however, there have to be available – but often 
invisible and unexploited – sources of energy. ‗Incubation‘, whether physical, biological or 
human, requires energy inputs, otherwise nothing happens; there is no free lunch. 
A well-known example is hurricane formation. The several TIEs that combine to produce a 
                                                 
7
 In a comprehensive review of self-organized criticality (SOC), Frigg (2003) observes that SOC appears in 
systems existing in both stable and changing niches. It has also been shown that SOC very well explains punctuated 
equilibrium in evolving species (Paczuski et al., 1995; Boettcher & Paczuski, 1996). Needless to say, punctuated 
equilibrium, by definition, stems from the coming and going of changing and stable niches. 
8
 Cities like London and New York spiral up from the first tiny settlements hundreds of years ago. Honda in the 
U.S. spiraled up from their employees‘ use of 50cc motor bikes in Los Angeles (Pascale, 1984). Wal-Mart began as 
a one-store operation by Sam Walton. Ford Motor Co. began as the Model T made on one assembly line. Many 
power law distributions show many small entities and also that many of them grow to medium and one extreme 
outcome. 
9
 While Eldredge and Gould (1972) were correct in their use of ‗punctuated equilibrium‘ so as to account to the 
gaps in the fossil record, most of Darwinian selectionist evolution (and all the evidence we have that it is correct), 
actually takes place in stable ecologies lasting millions of years – like alpine meadows, the Sahara Desert, the 
Brazilian rainforest, the oceans, etc. The evolutionary changes we see are evolution toward equilibrium conditions in 
stable ecologies or contexts (Van de Vijver et al., 1998). 
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hurricane are: (1) high temperature; (2) high water temperature; (3) humidity difference between 
the surface of the ocean and the troposphere; (4) a small instability (TIE) that causes an upward 
local convective (circular) motion of warm air; (5) the rapid cooling that ensues as the air rises, 
which liberates further energy (latent heat of condensation); (6) additional air sucked into the 
TIE-caused initial circular motion that subjects more air to the phase transition of warm-to-cold 
air; and finally (7) enough stability in the forgoing conditions for the process to continue long 
enough for the hurricane to develop. In highly chaotic environments such spirals are impossible. 
The 2007 bank-liquidity crisis shows analogous dynamics: (1) mortgage-backed securities are 
invented and packaged; (2) ‗derivatives‘ are invented as ‗safe‘ investment formulas, which allow 
very high leverages; (3) about $1 trillion Chinese foreign reserves flow into the U.S. bond 
market; (4) the Federal Reserve ‗discount rate‘ plunges to 2% after the dotcom bust in 2002 and 
then down to 1% in 2003; (5) people start using 5-year ‗teaser‘ loans to buy houses at low 
interest, with no requests from banks for credit reports or income statements; (6) the housing 
bubble starts in several countries; (7) the use of various financial engineering-based loan 
securitization and investment strategies develops; (8) banks leverage their deposits up to a 30/1, 
40/1, 50/1 and even 100/1 margins on loans made across the world; (9) the bubble starts to 
collapse in the U.S. in January 2006; (10) the 5-year teaser loans begin to expire in late 2006 and 
2007; (11) home-mortgage defaults and foreclosures skyrocket in the U.S.; (12) U.S. banks 
exhibit liquidity crises leading to bankruptcies; and finally (13) the U.S. liquidity crisis spreads 
world-wide. Any single element listed above may be insignificant in itself and uncorrelated with 
the final outcome, but it may tap into latent uncertainty that lingers in the markets. Once the 
wave of selling/buying starts locally, it feeds on itself and spreads like an epidemic (Dornbusch 
et al., 2000; Boyson et al., 2008; Gallegati et al., 2008). In this case, the availability of available 
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funds (the energy gradient or force: in this case Chinese money in the U.S. bond market, the 1% 
discount rate, and very lax mortgage requirements)
10
 were the pre-conditions energizing the start 
of the epidemic. 
Size of the melting zone. Complex systems exist in a state of dynamical balance in the melting 
zone (the region of emergence) between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 critical values. Below the 1
st
, imposing 
forces push them toward stasis, integration, equilibrium and ultimately isolation from the 
environment and equilibrium. Above the 2
nd
, quickly changing imposing forces push them 
toward chaos, frantic change, and ultimately disintegration. Sandwiched in the zone between 
order and chaos, systems show emergent complexity. However, the dynamics in the region of 
emergence when self-organization with respect to crisis management occurs are complicated. We 
outline some of these dynamics next: 
1. Chaos alters the size of the melting zone (between the 1st and 2nd critical values) as follows: 
 Chaos imposing on a tension that would normally tip a system over the 1st critical value, disrupts the 
consistency of the tension, thereby reducing its ‗tipping‘ force; chaos makes it harder for a coherent energy 
force to build up and stay consistent long enough to tip the system over the 1
st
 critical value; 
 Chaos imposing at the 2nd critical value increases the likelihood of a system tipping across the edge of chaos 
and into the region of chaos; more chaos makes it easier to tip across the edge of chaos –in effect it lowers 
the threshold; 
 Consequently, chaos reduces the size of the melting zone. 
2. A reduction in the size of the melting zone has two countervailing effects: 
 On the one hand, as the melting zone shrinks the likelihood that TIEs self-organize so as to scale up into 
extreme outcomes is reduced – with the result chaos reduces the likelihood of disasters; 
 On the other hand, as the melting zone shrinks the likelihood of human activities self-organizing to see the 
negative incubation-TIEs sooner, and self-organizing in ways that negate them are both reduced – with the 
result that the probability of disaster mitigation is reduced. 
 By this logic, chaos has no consistent effect in increasing or reducing the probability of extremes. 
3. But, a system‘s ability to tip across the 1st critical value is a function of both chaos and bureaucracy 
                                                 
10
 The Glass-Steagall Act, which was made law in 1933 and which prevented normal banks from taking risky 
investments, was repealed in 1999 (Kauffman, 2008). The Bush Administration, starting in 2002, adopted a policy 
of relaxing mortgage loan standards so that more minorities could buy houses (Becker et al., 2008). Most of the 
mortgage defaults have been by minority homeowners.  
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because both inhibit tipping ability at the edge of order. The findings from many crisis studies are that 
bureaucratic effects inhibit emergent self-organization of TIEs aimed at negating disasters much more 
than bureaucratic effects inhibit TIEs that scale up into disasters. Logically, if it were the other way 
around, incubation-type crises wouldn‘t happen. 
Of course, in principle, the build-up of imposing forces or energy gradients helping or 
hindering the self-organization of disaster-building TIEs or disaster-preventing TIEs can be 
monitored. Weick‘s concept of mindfulness (Weick et al., 1999) can be co-opted for this purpose 
and can be used as an indicator of the resilience of the system and of the size (thickness) of the 
melting zone. Mindfulness, then, can be bifurcated into seeing more quickly both kinds of TIEs – 
i.e., those apt to scale up into disasters and those that could be used as levers to negate the 
former.  Constant attention has to be given to the level of the imposing energy gradient and the 
width of the melting zone. The larger the latter, the more robust a firm is against external events 
and forces impinging on it.   
IV. TENSION, TIES & MINDFULNESS ON THE UNION PACIFIC 
Our objective for this section is to illustrate two key features of incubation crises: First, 
incubators usually are present in early stages of crises, as Turner (1976) points out; and second, 
that the theory of TIES is considerably underdeveloped in the classic discussions of mindfulness 
by Weick and colleagues (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). We begin with the 
UP/SP merger – described in detail by Weick and Sutcliffe – which offers a compelling example 
of how TIEs and their creation of minor crises were ignored by UP management during and after 
the merger, with a major crisis the result. 
A. Merger-caused tensions on the Union Pacific 
The passage of the Staggers Rail Act in 1980 led to the almost total deregulation of American 
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railroads. The number of railroads reduced from forty to ten and the over 100 year old Interstate 
Commerce Commission, set up in 1987 to negate rail monopolies, was decommissioned (Avery 
& Ericson, 2004). In 1995 the Surface Transportation Board [referred to as the Surf Board by all 
of the parties injured by the merger (Span, 2004)], approved the UP/SP merger despite the 
objections of the Federal Trade Commission; as well as the Justice, Transportation, and 
Agriculture Departments; rival railroads, numerous groups of customers, and especially coal 
shippers who could only use railroads. The UP‘s acquisition of the SP left the entire American 
West serviced only by two giant railroads – the UP being the largest in the nation with 30,000+ 
miles of track (Union Pacific, 2008).  
Even before the merger, the risk of future operational problems was readily apparent. The SP 
had a history of dysfunctional behaviour, bad operation and failures: First, the Marketing 
Department cut prices so as to overload the railroad so as to make the Production Department 
look bad, thereby enhancing Marketing‘s chief‘s chances to become the CEO; second, despite 
increased demand for shipping goods, too many cars were sitting unused because they were in 
the wrong place at the wrong time, and high locomotive-lease costs and crew overtime ate up the 
value of the increased business (which was priced too low by Marketing); third, when customers 
complained, Marketing responded by cutting prices further, thereby compounding the rail traffic 
flow problems; fourth, most of the SP track (which was the primary route between the Los 
Angeles ship port and Houston), was single tracked, which meant trains could not pass each 
other, which then made it the primary source of congestion, delay, and increased customer 
shipping costs – all of which started the gridlock on the UP after the merger, and fifth, the SP 
vacillated between reducing double track and yards to reduce expenses vs. keeping the yards and 
adding double track to reduce congestion (Brennan & Norton, 1998; Burke, 1998; Avery & 
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Ericson, 2004; Span, 2004). 
Despite the already well-known congestion problems and train-movement failures on the SP 
before the merger, a requirement of the Surf Board’s approval was to make over 4000 miles of 
UP/SP track available to the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) railroad (the only competing 
railroad in the American West) which, needless to say, exacerbated the congestion and traffic 
movement failure problems. In addition, the UP cut many SP jobs outright and then closed the 
SP headquarters which meant SP operations employees familiar with SP congestion and had tacit 
knowledge about quick remedies left the company (and, they didn‘t want to move from trendy 
San Francisco to the cornfields around Omaha, Nebraska). When remaining SP employees, who 
knew about the long history of gridlock on the SP, told their new UP bosses about the SP 
problems and solutions that worked, they were ignored. In their book, Weick and Sutcliffe make 
special mention of the arrogance of UP managers toward ―expendable‖ former SP employees. 
The UP/SP merger took place in July 1996. UP claimed it would save $627 million. In fact, 
‗by March 1998 delays in shipments had cost rail customers approximately $1 billion in curtailed 
production, reduced sales, and higher shipping costs‘ (Union Pacific, 2008). The UP was allowed 
to use BNSF tracks to avoid further congestion in Texas. And as we note below, there were 
accidents and people killed. Ironically, even though the extreme negative outcomes of TIEs on 
the SP were already evident, UP management‘s arrogance prevented them from seeing them. 
Pretty much the same TIEs on the post-merger UP led to an even worse outcome: total gridlock 
occurring in October, 1997 (Frailey, 1998). Needless to say, arrogance and groupthink (Janis, 
1972) have to be pretty strong for such obvious knowledge of TIEs not to prevail! 
B. Holland’s TIEs that bind on the UP after the merger 
To begin, we highlight some of the TIEs on the UP that Weick and Sutcliffe describe (2001, pp. 
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4–10) in Table 1 below. Here we try to mention only incidents that are at the level of initial clues 
– they are seemingly random events that are essentially trivial and occur now and then under 
normal circumstances; these are initial clues – meaning that they are TIEs that show no evidence 
of scaling effects at this time; there are no obvious reasons to assume scalability at this point in 
time in terms of any of the scalability theories we describe below. BUT, they are all clues that 
things are not going well on the railroad. Incubation is close at hand.  
>>>Insert Table 1 about here<<< 
The foregoing are examples of Holland‘s ‗tiny initiating events‘ (TIEs) – nothing more. In 
Table 2 we now paraphrase a number of higher-impact events that are set off by these TIEs. 
These are evidence of scalability. For example:  
 Cuts in personnel, crew fatigue and on duty too long scales up due to stalled trains and clogged 
sidings; 
 Poor engine maintenance and tired crews going off the clock scales up as unavailable locomotives and 
trains stuck on sidings; 
 Not enough locomotives and trains stuck on sidings scales up to trains backed up in clogged yards; 
 No crews, no locomotives, trains stuck on sidings and yards led to total system gridlock. 
>>>Insert Table 2 about here<<< 
The small events spiralled up into scalable events that eventually led to system-wide gridlock 
– the ultimate extreme outcome. None of these events could result from a single isolated TIE 
such as those we mention in Table 1. The latter have to scale up via some causal process such 
that they have broader impact. We will detail this process in Section V. 
Having described what we have reduced to brief descriptions in the foregoing tables, Weick 
and Sutcliffe then describe some of UP‘s managerial response. We paraphrase these in Table 3. 
Needless to say, the list of management failures gives obvious reason to conclude that UP 
management‘s style made them truly un-mindful. They rather obviously didn’t see what they 
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weren’t looking for; they didn‘t see all of the TIEs that were present and that they really should 
have been paying attention to. They could have prevented the disaster if they had been more 
savvy about how their railroad disaster was indeed the result of TIEs that bind. 
>>>Insert Table 3 about here<<< 
C. Weick’s approach to managerial responses: Mindfulness to pick up on TIEs 
Weick and Sutcliffe‘s identifications of UP management‘s failures would appear to provide an 
accurate description of events and, in fact, could be broadly applied to almost any kind of 
organizational failure that is seemingly due to management failures. By this we suggest that 
many of the ‗mindfulness‘ solutions they wish to apply rather narrowly to high-reliability 
organizations – specifically to negating TIEs early on so as to prevent them from scaling up into 
extremes – don‘t seem much differentiated from causes attributed to management failures in 
general. However, they do mention:  
 ‗Early and ample signs that the UP did not understand…‘ (p. 8), and failures to detect that allow 
‗…unexpected events to spin out of control‘. (p. 9)  
 They suggest that managers need to ‗…treat any lapse as a symptom that something is wrong…that 
could have severe consequences if separate small errors happen to coincide at one awful 
moment…‘. (p. 10)  
 They say ‗resilience is a combination of keeping errors small…‘. (p. 14)  
Also, extreme mindfulness can lead to organizations that are in a permanent state of 
fibrillation and overreact to even minor stimuli, in other words to ‗hypochondriac‘ organizations. 
Hypochondriac organizations pay excessive attention to tiny signals and live in a constant state 
of fear. In this case, mindfulness may lead to fragility rather than resilience. The distinction 
between inconsequential stimuli (that can be ignored) and TIEs (that have the potential of 
spiralling up) should be attended to on the basis of evident scale-free theories, as we argue in this 
paper.  Management scholars always worry about case writers who are ‗theory laden‘ – they see 
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what their theories tell them to look for (Kuhn, 1962; Franklin et al., 1989; Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). But the opposite may be true as well: One doesn’t see what one isn’t looking for. For us, 
scalability dynamics and their causes are what one may not see unless one is better trained to see 
them. Elsewhere (Andriani and McKelvey, 2009) we describe fifteen theories about why 
scalability dynamics occur. In Section V we describe five of the fifteen that most readily explain 
the various scaling dynamics that Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) describe. If management had been 
more clued in about how the events we describe in Table 1 scale up into the events we mention 
in Table 2 the disaster wouldn‘t have happened. 
>>>Insert Table 4 about here<<< 
V. USING SCALABILITY TO SEE TIES SOONER: THE UP EXAMPLE 
Since we have a good example of TIEs scaling up into the total gridlock of the U.P. railroad 
across an area about 1000 miles north-to-south and 2000 miles east-to-west we start by 
describing how several scalability theories apply to organizations in general. We follow each 
general description with what happened on the U.P. railroad.  
Square-cube-quarter-power law: In biology, many scaling laws take the allometric
11
 form Y 
~ M 
b
, where Y is some observable and M the mass of the organism. Among these, West, Brown, 
& Enquist (1997) cite metabolic rate, height of trees, life span, growth rate, heart rate, DNA 
nucleotide substitution rate, lengths of aortas, size of genomes, mass of cerebral grey matter, 
density of mitochondria, etc. In general the exponent b is a multiple of ±¼. The square-cube law 
applies to the ratio of volume to surface – surface units keep subdividing to stay in constant ratio 
as volume increases. The ‗¼ power law‘ stems from fluid flow: volume sets the energy use rate 
                                                 
11
 Allometry refers to a type of growth in which the parts of an organism grow at a different rate. Therefore the 
proportions of the different parts changes during growth. 
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(cube); surface sets the energy absorption rate (square); and the fluid flow rate between surface 
and volume is reflected in the ¼ power ratio to square and cube. To achieve this, organisms have 
developed common evolutionary mechanisms based on fractal geometry and fractal flow. We 
have no direct evidence of this mechanism at work in organizations, but we note that the problem 
the biologists have solved applies to organizations as well. Firms operate in competitive 
ecosystems  – with M&A activities acting as equivalents to predator/prey fractal dynamics in 
biological ecosystems – defined by the need to maximize revenues (exchange area between firm 
and customers) and minimize expenses (energy spent for developing, manufacturing and 
distributing products). If this constraint on the revenue-energy relationship can be given a 
meaningful geometric economic form, we may discover similar allometric relationships in 
organization science.  
U.P. Application: This scalability law was brought into organization theory by Haire (1959). 
Stephan (1983) translated it into ‗surface‘ and ‗volume‘ employees. Surface employees deal with 
customers and bring in business and revenues. Volume employees are those who administer and 
produce products and services. In the UP, then, surface employees connect to customers; volume 
employees fix tracks, sort trains in yards, dispatch and run trains, manage things, etc. The ¼ 
power law, initially applied to blood flows in a body can also restrict surface or volume growth. 
Here, it applies to flows of trains and goods over the tracks. From the merger with SP , 
customers were about doubled; track length was roughly doubled – but train flows along any 
single track had to stay about the same. Just from knowing the surface-volume law, one can 
easily see that the railroad is immediately out of balance. Even though ‗surface‘ was roughly 
doubled, single-track flows remained unchanged. Worse, volume employees were cut when, in 
fact the square-cube law would call for increases in either efficiency or numbers at least in some 
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places/jobs. Knowing the surface-volume law, one could easily predict the extreme outcome and 
then try to manage it away. 
Combination Theory: Here the only requirement for a power law to emerge is the number of 
elements in a complex system. This theory begins with Preston‘s (1981) ‗diffonential‘, which he 
shows results when two exponential distributions are multiplied – the result is a lognormal. West 
and Deering (1995) and Newman (2005) both make the case for the simple addition of exponents 
in the basic power law equation, p(y) ~ e
a,b,c,d n
. When this happens, exponentials and/or 
lognormals in combination create a power law – the more of them that are combined the longer 
the tail of the distribution and the more obvious the power law. In this theory, the likely 
occurrence of interaction is simply presumed as a naturally inherent likelihood as systems 
become more complex. If some number of the elements are individually likely to generate Pareto 
distributions – as we argue in what follows – combination theory tells us that organizations are 
inevitably going to emerge as fractal structures unless there are explicit attempts by management 
to negate these ‗natural‘ dynamics. 
U.P. Application: Normal distributions of different variables remain normally distributed if 
they are combined (even becoming more normally distributed, in fact). But if somewhat skewed 
distributions are combined (even just added together in terms of impact), they become more 
skewed. If several are combined, the result is a Pareto distribution. Let‘s suppose that before the 
merger UP activities were normally distributed – mostly things worked as expected but with 
some random deviations because of events like the flu or storms. Thus, normally, train crews are 
on time; trains are on time; locomotives are at the right location on time; repair and dispatch 
crews are on time; locomotives and crews and other railroaders function effectively most of the 
time, etc. Then comes the merger. Now each of the foregoing normal distributions become 
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skewed. Since there are several, and since they interact with combined effects, we see scalability 
with the result that the entire system becomes gridlocked rather quickly. Because of the 
cumulative skewing, one could easily predict the extreme outcome and then try to manage 
against it. Worse, in this case there had already been visible combinations of disruptive events on 
the SP that clearly shifted ‗normal‘ railroad behaviour toward more skewed distributions. 
Least effort: Zipf (1949) argued that ‗least effort‘ explained his ‗Zipf‘s Law‘ – a power law 
of word usage in English, French, and Spanish. To put it simply: Least effort means, I won’t put 
effort into using words you are unfamiliar with; you won’t put effort into learning words I don’t 
use. We each, therefore, save energy, become more efficient, and eventually use ‗least effort‘. 
Least-effort theory is about efficiency. Ferrer i Cancho and Solé (2003) use a computational 
model to confirm this. Least-effort theory is now shown to apply only under changing 
circumstances. Dahui et al. (2005) test whether Zipf‘s Law applies to Chinese as well as English. 
Inadvertently, they find something different – the power law signature applies only during the 
period before Emperor Qin Shihuang‘s unification when Chinese characters were changing. 
They conclude that the law does not apply when the number of characters is stable. The ‗change‘ 
effect is now confirmed, again inadvertently by Ishikawa (2005), who shows that Pareto‘s law 
holds in companies where there is higher rate of growth, but Gibrat‘s lognormal distribution 
applies to large firms where growth is slow. Dahui et al. (2006) show that the distribution of 
firms in growth markets is a power law but in markets without growth it is Gamma or 
exponential. Finally, Podobnik et al. (2006) find empirically – and test further with a 
computational model – that time-series indices in transition economies (i.e., Hungary, Russia, 
Slovenia, etc.) fit Paretian rather than Gaussian distributions. The basic theory, readily applicable 
to organizations, is that efficient interactive transactions – like people talking to each other or 
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buying-selling – are Pareto distributed.  
U.P. Application: To begin, UP and SP had different tacit, day-to-day, and on-the-job 
languages composed of in-house, local on-the-track and in-the-yards usages; even local, every-
day ‗management‘ word usages were somewhat different. When UP took over SP, UP language 
was supposed to dominate. UP management wanted to take over SP without their UP language 
and behaviours changing; SP customs, language, and behaviours were to disappear. But, of 
course, they didn‘t and couldn‘t. Instead of seeing two organizational tacit and explicit languages 
transitioning toward a least-effort based new, commonly understood language, their languages 
remained frozen. Frozen languages and markets we now know offer evidence of missing self-
organization (Ishikawa, 2006; Podobnik et al.; 2006). As the two languages changed toward 
common usage, we should see some terms come to totally dominate the new railroad, other terms 
appear important but not so dominant, and some words would decline to persisting, individual, 
isolated usage. Knowing this least-effort scalability theory, UP management should reasonably 
have expected and even tried to enable the development of a new cross-merged railroad 
language, with word usage appearing as a newly-formed power law distribution (not that we 
would expect them to know this part). 
Preferential attachment: This linear positive-feedback process (Krugman, 1996) underlies 
biological and social networks, going from groups of individuals to groups of organizations. The 
most common descriptive phrase is, ‗the rich get richer‘ –a basic positive-feedback process – i.e., 
profits from one firm allow a rich person to borrow and buy another profitable firm, and so on. 
The Internet grows according to preferential attachment (Dorogovtsev & Mendes, 2003). The 
same happens with cities and airport hubs – larger entities attract even more people or flights 
(Barabási 2002). Marketing and sales via the Internet is very much a positive feedback process 
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(Gladwell, 2002). Any time a system grows by adding nodes to an existing network their growth 
will amplify historically generated imbalances among the links. Absent top-down regulation, 
older nodes will gain more links and generate a Pareto distribution. Since organizations are made 
of social networks, preferential attachment plays a crucial role in the formation and evolution of 
organizations. Other examples are Arthur‘s (1994) study of increasing returns [firms making 
profits can invest in things that make even more profits (Microsoft is the best modern example)] 
and the biotech industry (Powell et al., 2005).  
U.P. Application: This theory suggests that as the UP and SP social and work-related 
networks merged, some individuals would emerge as more ‗connectively‘ important in getting 
the new system and new ways of doing things up and running. Old dominant nodes could 
reasonably be expected to be replaced by new ‗stars‘. Instead, the old-guard railroaders kept 
themselves dominant and kept the old separate networks dominant – the old UP network trying 
for dominance over both railroads; the old SP network in rebellion, passive resistance, and slow-
downs rather than joining in a collective reframing of a new combined network. Managers aware 
of this theory would expect network dynamics to change dramatically with the merger and would 
‗manage‘ toward this end. 
Self-organized criticality: When irregular grains of sand fall on a sandpile, the effects of 
gravity and friction between sand grains cause the sandpile to constantly reshape itself via small-
to-large avalanches so as to maintain a specific slope (Bak et al., 1987; Bak 1996). Bak calls this 
‗self-organized criticality‘ (SOC). This effect occurs because the sand grains are irregular and 
sticky, not smooth like tiny marbles or M&M Peanuts. The distribution of the frequency of the 
many small avalanches vs. a few large ones shows a power law. Arguing that individual 
decisions are sticky like irregular sand grains, Bak applies SOC to economies. Since the tension 
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between supply and demand builds and the actions to reduce it are not of equal size or regularity, 
economies operate at or near the critical state. Economic fluctuations (business cycles) are SOC 
(Scheinkman & Woodford, 1994). We see SOC in the price of cotton and financial markets 
(Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2004), consumer product sales (Moss, 2002, Sornette et al., 2004), 
entrepreneurial actions leading to different sized firms (Stanley et al., 1996), and in the stock 
markets of transition economies (Podobnik et al., 2006) – all showing power law signatures.  
U.P. Application: UP management at the time of the merger was totally old-line railroaders – 
the CEO started as a brakeman – one of the least skilled people on a railroad! Management was 
top-down, centralized, thought of itself as victimized, had demeaning attitudes toward workers, 
worked to prevent improvisation – what we call self-organization. In short, totally top-down 
control; alas, emergent self-organization was unacceptable. Consequently there could be no 
notion or reality of SOC – that is, the workers closest to the operational problems were not 
allowed (actually discouraged) to self-organize toward solutions. Consequently, at a most critical 
time of adaptation, SOC was absent. Bak (1996) and many others [see Brunk (2002) and Frigg 
(2003) for many more citations] argue that SOC and consequent fractal structures are widespread 
and essential to biological evolution, change, and survival in changing conditions. None of this 
was allowed at UP. But, management could have used complexity leadership (Hazy et al. 2007; 
McKelvey, 2008; Uhl-Bien & Marion 2008) to enable SOC dynamics and, thus, more rapid and 
effective change in response to the post-merger conditions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We began by distinguishing between incubation-based and smouldering crises. Turner (1976) 
uses ‗incubation phase‘ instead of smouldering to describe when ‗…a chain of discrepant events 
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develop and accumulate unnoticed‘ (p. 381; our italics). Reason (1990) calls incubation events 
‗pathogens‘ – ‗minor causes, misperceptions, misunderstandings and miscommunications‘. 
Lester and King (2006, p. 3, our italics) say that ‗smouldering crises begin as small, internal 
problems that...leave a trail of early-warning signals‘. Unfortunately, some definitions of 
smouldering make it look pretty much like incubation. 
We argue that Holland‘s (2002) tiny initiating events (TIEs) are at the base of incubation-
induced crises. Using the ‗total-gridlock‘ crisis resulting from the merger of the Union Pacific 
(UP) and Southern Pacific (SP) railroads as a negative risk example, we argue that various 
external and internal sources of energy gradients (tension) pushed the merged firm over the ‗edge 
of order‘ into the region of emergence – i.e., Kauffman‘s ‗melting zone‘ (1993). This zone is 
defined once a system tips over the 1
st
 critical value (Bénard, 1901; McKelvey, 2001, 2008). But 
in addition, the tensions in the new UP were so well spread across various levels of the firm that 
many different degrees of freedom were activated. We show that while many self-organizing 
events leading up to the disaster emerged in the melting zone, none of the levers management 
could have used to dampen them emerged. As a result a number of negative TIEs were initiated 
and then they scaled up into extreme outcomes affecting large segments of the railroad. 
Combined, the multiple extreme outcomes here and there across the railroad collectively led to 
the total gridlock of the UP. 
We begin with a short pre-merger history of traffic-flow failures on the SP and then describe 
how TIEs on the UP railroad scaled up to collectively cause total gridlock – drawing from Span 
(2004), Union Pacific (2008), and Avery & Ericson (2004), along with Weick and Sutcliffe‘s 
description of the merger fiasco (2001). Then we relate TIEs to Weick‘s ‗mindfulness‘ (Weick et 
al., 1999). Next, we review key concepts from complexity science, paying particular attention to: 
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first, scalability and the scale-free causes that serve to escalate TIEs into extreme outcomes; 
second, ideas from econophysics, such as fractals, Pareto and power law rank/frequency 
distributions; and third, energy gradients as sources of tension that tip systems across the 1
st
 
critical value and into the region of emergent complexity. We pay special attention to situations 
in which the region is so narrow that order-creation dynamics at both the edge of order and the 
edge of chaos are activated in parallel. When this happens, some number of TIEs are 
simultaneously activated with the result that several TIEs combine to create the equivalent of 
hurricanes and perfect storms in firms embedded in hi-energy situations and, thus, subject to 
adaptive tension. Then, drawing from the 15 scale-free theories explaining why some TIEs scale 
up into having significant effects described by Andriani and McKelvey (2009), we detail how 
five of these characterize TIEs on the UP that scaled up to contribute to the total gridlock.  
Even though TIEs had already caused extreme negative outcomes on the SP, the culture, 
arrogance, and firing of SP employees in the post-merged UP prevented the latter from seeing 
the prior-occurring TIEs and results on the SP. Needless to say, there are many other well-known 
post-disaster studies that have identified the same process. TIEs and employees who see the TIEs 
early on are simply ignored. The literature on risk management tells this story about incubation 
crises over and over. Building from the phrase, ‗You don’t see what you aren’t looking for‘, our 
primary argument is that learning about scale-free causes and how they might show up on the 
UP, or in any other firm, would help managers know sooner and better what kinds of activities 
might start scaling up into extreme outcomes. In this way we aim to improve managers‘ ‗seeing‘ 
ability. Weick is on the right track with his mindfulness concept, but details as to how 
mindfulness translated into seeing ability remains vague and without much theory or research 
basis. One can ask: Mindful about what? The problem is how to get ahead of post-crisis case 
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analyses and storytelling.  
We discuss ways in which five scale-free causes combined after the merger – under the 
tension of the UP acquiring an already problematic SP –to spiral up to create total gridlock. 
These causes are widely recognized elsewhere as some of the fifteen scale-free causes Andriani 
and McKelvey (2009) assemble from various sources in the literature. With these, we give 
mindfulness theoretical substance. There are indeed various kinds of smouldering TIEs that 
managers can become more sensitive to in advance. And, finally, managers need to not forget 
that every time increased tension hits, it is what Smith (2002) calls a ‗trigger event‘ – whether 
the tension is caused by management as in the examples of what the Russians call ‗storming’ 
(Radell, 1992), or impinges from the surrounding environment, what are ordinarily meaningless, 
chaotic, random-appearing incidents that can usually be ignored, all of a sudden have a high 
probability of combining to trigger extreme negative outcomes. 
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Table 1:  TIE-Level Clues 
1. Large cuts in personnel 2. Crews on duty longer than the law allowed 
3. Fatigued crews 4. Equipment not maintained 
5. Dispatchers unfamiliar with assigned territory 6. Shipments lost; can‘t be traced 
7. Speed of trains drops from 19 to 12 mph 8. Crews falling asleep while running trains 
9. Four employees killed in yard accidents 10. Collisions kill seven more people 
11. Not enough locomotives 12. Trains backing up in Englewood yard 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Evidence of Scalability 
1. Shippers upset by delays getting worse & worse 2. Trains stuck on sidings without locomotives 
3. Oct. 8;  550 freights standing still 4. All sidings filled with backed up trains 
5. Englewood yard locked up with 6,179 cars 6. Stalled trains meant crews‘ duty time expired 
7.Trains going in opposite directions couldn‘t pass each 
other on a single mainline because sidings were filled with 
backed-up trains 
8. Since most stalled trains were pointed toward the 
Englewood yard in Huston, no trains could leave Englewood 
because of the blocked mainlines 
9. 1800 locomotives unavailable because they were stuck in 
the wrong place  
10. Sorting of car into trains by destination was centralized, 
thereby exacerbating the delays 
11. More engines sent to Englewood to unblock system; but 
they just added to the blockage 
12. Denial of failures repeated at all levels of the hierarchy 
13. Top management ignored early warning signs 14. Unexpected events spin out of control 
15. ‗The system was gridlocked as far away as Chicago‘. (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 6) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Evidence of Management Failures  
1. Old-line operations guys were running the railroad; CEO 
started as a brakeman 
2. Blamed blizzards, track work, flash floods, derailments, 
Hurricane Danny, poor maintenance 
3. Mentality: UP is the victim not the culprit 4. Ignored early warning signs 
5. Failure to articulate important mistakes 6. Didn‘t organize to detect them 
7. Allowed events to spin out of control 8. Had inflated views of its capabilities 
9. ‗UP…was the poster child of arrogance‘ (p. 6) 10. ‗Crisis times treated just like normal times‘ (p. 17) 
11. ‗Preoccupation with success and its denial of 
failures…repeated at all levels of the hierarchy‘ (p. 11) 
12. ‗UP executives neither looked for failures nor believed that 
they would find many if they did‘ (p. 11) 
13. ‗Slowdowns were underreported and allowed to incubate until they were undeniable &…irreversible‘ (p. 11) 
14. ‗People keep mentioning intimidation, a militaristic culture, hollow promises to customers, abandonment of workarounds, 
production pressure on train crews…‘. (p. 14) 
15. ‗The UP…favored centralization and formalization and treated improvisation as insubordination‘ (p. 15) 
 
